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CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Held not to give Environmental Protection Agency Administrator or Federal Courts discretion in disapproving state implementation plans on grounds of
technological or economic infeasibility. Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
-U.S.-,
96 S.Ct. 2518
(1976).

In response to the primary and secondary air quality standards
promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency,' Missouri formulated an implementation plan as required by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.2 Because only the St. Louis
area exceeded sulfur dioxide levels 3 as established by the Administrator,4 the Missouri implementation plan focused on control and
regulation of emissions in the St. Louis area. The State's plan was
effective immediately and allowed variances for sources that could
not comply.'
Petitioner, Union Electric Co., was a public utility supplying
electricity to the St. Louis area and parts of Missouri, Illinois, and
Iowa. The coal fired plants in the St. Louis area were subject to
sulfur dioxide emission standards established by the Missouri implementation plan.
Under the provisions of the federal statute a petition for review of
the Administrator's action in approving a state implementation plan
may be filed with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the appropriate
district if made within thirty days from the date of such promulgation.6 Union Electric did not file a petition for review of the Administrator's approval. Instead, Union Electric applied for and
received one year variances from the State agency for its generating
plants. In May of 1974, while Union Electric was applying for an
extension of variances for two of its three plants, the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency notified Union Electric that
1.
2.
3.
4.

40 C.F.R.
42 U.S.C.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.

§ 50 (1975).
§ § 1857a-1 8571 (1970).
§ 52.1321 (1975).
§ § 50.4-50.5 (1975).

5. See Rev. Mo. Stat. § 203.110 (1969).

6. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
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its emissions violated the standards of the state implementation plan.
After receiving this notice from the Administrator, Union Electric
filed a petition with the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals7 for review of
the Administrator's 1972 approval of the Missouri implementation
plan. Union Electric argued that because of various economic and
technological difficulties that arose after the thirty day review
period 8 it was entitled to a judicial review of the validity of the
Administrator's approval of the plan. The Court of Appeals held that
"only matters which, if known to the Administrator at the time of
his action, would justify setting aside that action are properly reviewable after the initial 30 day review period." 9 The court then concluded "that economic and technological considerations do not
afford a basis for review under § 307b . . ."I I and that it was therefore "without jurisdiction to consider the claims raised by [Union
Electric] . . ."1
Because of the conflict among the circuits on the issue of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970), the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.' I
The jurisdictional question before the Court was whether review
of the Administrator's action in approving the state implementation
plan could be based on a failure to consider economic or technological infeasibility. The Court found that, because the Administrator could not consider economic or technological infeasibility in
evaluating or approving a state implementation plan, it had no
authority to review that which the Administrator could not have
considered. By framing the issue in this manner, the Court concerned
itself with determining the power of the Administrator.
The Administrator took the position that he had no authority to
reject a state implementation plan because it might have been economically or technologically infeasible. Union Electric, on the other
hand, argued that considerations of claims of technological and eco7. 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970) provides:
Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval, or after such date if such petition is based solely on
grounds arising after such 30th day.
9. 515 F.2d 206, 216 (8th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 219.
11. Id. at 221.
12. For holdings contrary to the holdings of the 8th Circuit see Buckeye Power, Inc. v.
EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168-169 (6th Cir. 1973),Appalacian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495,
505-507 (4th Cir. 1973), Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973), Getty Oil
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). For
cases supporting the 8th Circuit holding see South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,
675-676 (lst Cir. 1974), Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 317 (5th Cir. 1974), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 1974).
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nomic infeasibility were within the Administrator's authority. In
making this argument, Union Electric pointed out that one of the
eight criteria' I that a state implementation plan must meet to justify
the Administrator's approval required attainment of the "national
primary ambient air quality standard ...as expeditiously as practicable but in no case later than three years from the date of approval
of such plan ... "1
and attainment of a "national secondary ambient air quality standard" within "a reasonable time . . .", I Union
Electric asserted that these time requirements necessarily required
the Administrator to consider economic and technologic infeasibility.
In rejecting Union Electric's argument the Court looked to the
legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and
found that the time requirements for the national primary ambient
air quality standard represented a well formulated congressional
policy in favor of technology forcing. The Court noted the Senate
Committee's report.
The Committee determined that ... the health of the people is more
important than the question of whether the early achievement of
ambient air quality standards protective of health is technically
16
feasible ...
The Court found the congressionally determined time requirement
removed considerations of technological and economic infeasibility
from the scope of the Administrator's authority.
Because there was no specific time requirement for national
secondary air quality standards and because there was no actual
debate on the time limit, Union Electric argued that the federal
standards were to be met precisely by the States and could not be
exceeded by them. Union Electric also contended that if economic
and technological infeasibility were present, then the Administrator
Would be forced to reject the implementation plan, at least in regard
to secondary standards involving public welfare rather than public
health.
The Court admitted technology forcing was not expressly a part of
the federal standards relating to secondary air quality standards but
instead found the individual States had the power to adopt a technology forcing policy in connection with secondary standards. The
Court again looked at the legislative history of the specific provision
13.
14.
15.
16.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1 8 57c-5(a)(2) (1970).
Id. at § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i).
Id. at § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii).
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1970).
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and noted that both the Senate and House bills allowed States to
submit plans stricter than the federal standards demanded. Because
the individual States had the power to enact stricter standards, the
Administrator had no authority to reject state plans for that reason.
The Court therefore held that "the language of § 1 I0(a)(2)(A) 1
provides no basis for the Administrator ever to reject a state implementation plan on the ground that it is economically or technologically infeasible."' 8
To provide further support for its holding the Court pointed to
two procedures whereby Union Electric could have obtained relief
from difficulties created by economic or technological infeasibility.
First, if the Governor of the particular State requests at the time of
the implementation, the statute allows a polluter a two year extension of the three year deadline if, among other things, it is technologically or economically infeasible for the state polluter to
comply with the State plan.' I Second, the State, after the approval
of the State implementation plan, may obtain, through application
of the Governor of the particular State, a one year postponement of
compliance where such postponement is based on technological or
economic grounds.2 0
The Court concluded its analysis by pointing out that Congress'
determination, viz., that technology forcing, despite its risks, was
required in order to move forward in protecting the environment and
that States should have the power to implement stricter standards
than those set down on a national level, required the Court to refrain
from reviewing the Administrator's action when such review would
force the Court to nullify the clear intent of Congress.
The concurring opinion of Justice Powell, though admitting that
the majority's reasoning was accurate, emphasized the possible negative effects the Court's decision might have on Union Electric's customers. Because it was clear to Justice Powell that Union Electric
could not have continued operating if forced to comply with the
restrictions contained in the implementation plan, he felt that "the
shutdown of an urban area's electrical services could have an even
more serious impact on the health of the public than that created by
a decline in ambient air quality."'" Justice Powell, when he stated
"that Congress, if fully aware of this draconian possibility, would
strike a different balance, ' 22 implied that the Court might have been
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See 42 U.S.C. § 18 57c-5(a) (1970).
-. U.S. -,
96 S.Ct. 2518, 2529 (1976).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970).
See id. § 1857c-5(f).
U.S.
,96 S.Ct. at 2532.
Id.
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justified in inferring a different congressional intent. Justice Powell's
implied suggestion, however, would have required the Court to ignore what it had determined was the clear intent of Congress.
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency has three
important implications. First, it firmly establishes that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, because of the underlying congressional policy of technology forcing in the area of air
pollution, has absolutely no authority to consider technological or
economic infeasibility when he evaluates and promulgates a state
implementation plan. This lack of authority on the part of the
Administrator effectively takes away from the courts any power to
review technological or economic infeasibility as it relates to cases
arising under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. In the area of
environmental pollution, technological and economic infeasibility
has been the strongest argument industrial polluters have had against
enforcement of state and federal air quality standards. The end result
of the Court's decision is to put some teeth into the enforcement of
air quality standards.
Second, the decision implies that, if the Administrator has considered economic or technological infeasibility in his approval of a
state implementation plan, such action would be an abuse of the
Administrator's discretion. If this conclusion is accurate, any action
on the part of the Administrator on his approval of state implementation plans that considered technological or economic infeasibility
would be subjec to review by the courts.
Third, the Court's holding gives the individual States considerable
autonomy in establishing secondary air quality standards, as long as
those standards meet federal minimum requirements. This allows the
States the same technology forcing tool Congress sought to employ
in enforcing primary air quality standards.
Although the holding of the Court, if limited to its narrowest
interpretation, means only that the Court will not review the promulgation of state implementation plans as long as they meet the necessary statutory requirements, the language of the Court indicates that
it strongly supports Congress' policy of technology forcing. The end
result is that the Environmental Protection Agency can apply more
certain sanctions against polluters that do not comply with state air
quality emission controls. The sanctions will be more certain because
polluters no longer will be able to postpone compliance with emission standards by seeking review by the courts. According to the
Court's holding, neither the courts nor the Administrator have the
authority to invalidate or modify state implementation plans on
grounds of economic or technological infeasibility.
SCOTT A.TAYLOR

